Supply Advisory Team Update

FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT Supply SAT Update

The Financial Management (FM)/Integrated Logistics Support (ILS)/Acquisition/ Information Technology (IT) Supply Advisory Team (SAT) determined that a prudent approach to minimizing the timing impact of budgetary changes on logistics support would lead us to develop three key deliverables that revolve around People, Training and Policy.

PEOPLE GOAL: We have identified a preliminary concept of military and civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) who would be in a position to alert Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) of pending budgetary changes, and those that should be alerted, so that we can establish the work-around communication channels prior to the change to the Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 and training regime taking hold. This step is designed to overcome a systemic oversight on the logistics support strategies we reviewed and the lack of clarity in the DoD 500 series. This is not all-inclusive; rather these are the people that would assist in more fully developing the list and deploying the training module.

TRAINING GOAL: We have developed a short training module to articulate the policy change and the need for it at the Defense Acquisition University, National Defense University, and Navy Postgraduate School capstone courses for program managers (PMs), comptrollers, contracting, and logistics.

POLICY GOAL: We have created a draft change to the DoD 5000 that would indicate the requirement that outyear budget changes affecting the downstream logistics support be communicated with NAVSUP, DLA and other key stakeholders based on the systems place in the acquisition life cycle. The draft covers the tech data package and other info/assumptions needed by the organic support activities to provide short notice organic weapons system support.

A. THE JOURNEY

The initial sessions of the FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT team revolved around defining our backgrounds, skillsets and current billets to fully flesh out our team’s strengths, biases and gaps with respect to the Team Mission Statement, which was provided: Map current logistics and IT processes to identify process/support gaps. Propose changes to improve network integration, increased cyber readiness, and Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) compliance related to acquisition (e.g. performance based logistics (PBL), contractor logistics support (CLS), Big A – big acquisition programs) and ILS (e.g. tech data ownership).

Additionally, we were provided examples of areas to be explored/developed:

  1. Integration of organic and commercial logistics networks to identify the appropriate balance between PBL, CLS, and organic support for new and existing weapon systems.
  2. Examine the Supply Corps role in the development of requirements within the acquisition life cycle.
  3. Evaluate current financial reporting systems for financial improvement plan (FIP)/FIAR compliance and cyber vulnerability.

This led to a few sessions of storming/norming/conforming and posting potential targets for the team to consider, which covered a broad range of topics that encompass our broad charter.
Targets for FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT SAT efforts:

  • Integration of organic and commercial logistics networks to identify the appropriate balance between PBL, CLS, and organic support for new and existing weapon systems.
  • Examine the Supply Corps role in the development of requirements within the acquisition life cycle.
  • Evaluate current financial reporting systems for FIP/FIAR compliance and cyber vulnerability.
  • Given the cybersecurity environment and potential that some part or all of a network could be taken offline for an extended period of time with little or almost no unclassified warning, how would we operate with little or no connectivity and diminished or non-existent access to some of the applications that would be too expensive/time-consuming to upgrade to current security protocols. Are Supply Corps officers placed appropriately in the requirements development phase of the acquisition life cycle and with linkage to the security expertise at the U.S. Cyber Command to identify and mitigate risks to the logistics systems upon which we rely?
  • Flow diagram/map Standardized Accounting and Reporting System-Field Level, Enterprise Resource Planning, various logistics programs.
  • NAVSUP Headquarters changes/releases for FIAR compliance are out (Navy Information Application Product Suite), but many ships have problems with comm links issues preventing refreshes.
  • Supply chain side – establishment of trusted commercial IT partners – provide parts and scanners which are genuine and uncompromised.
  • Acquisition – third party vendors need to report cyber vulnerabilities that they uncover/discover, perhaps a contract clause.
  • Look at maritime allowancing process. Lots of interfacing. Configuration/allowancing products – opportunities for integration.
  • Better integration of maintenance and supply systems…better planning and execution.
  • Reporting systems – synchronize them so we get standard reporting.
  • Outfitting, organic PBLs – we send money to each other to produce products/provide services – how do the IT systems line up to accomplish this?

This “spit-balling” of targets led the Team to bucket our ideas into three main categories and subsets. The Team selected our focus area by assessing where we could contribute to real long-term change on an issue that is of interest to the Supply Corps and where there did not seem to be another effort pursuing the exact same goal. The actual deliverable would be revisions to the DoD 5000 requiring PMs to update their integrated budget/timelines. While awaiting this change, Supply Corps members throughout DoD would play an important role accomplishing communications and providing visibility in order to ‘bridge the gap’ until the DoD 5000 is changed. Rear Adm. Yuen’s and Rear Adm. Haven’s discussion on the potential training
opportunities offered us a great idea and opportunity to integrate policy, lifecycle and budget decisions upfront – as early as possible. This discussion put some flesh on the bones of “…skillset cultivation, talent management, the integration of funding cycles with lifecycle costs and human capital strategies, denial of access to communications, and leveraging post- deployment briefs to drive future processes.”

The team developed a Research and Investigation Plan to Achieve our Mission and shifted a bit to include ideas brought up during the leadership brief, primarily three vectors to attach – people, training and policy. We cover our plan and results sequentially below.

B. RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION PLAN TO ACHIEVE OUR MISSION

Key references for review – Program documentation and information flow diagrams for selected current, and proposed systems. CYBERSAFE Instruction, Logistics Support Plan requirements, Allowancing Process, systems commands’ (SYSCOM) policies, Federal Acquisition Regulations, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System and Deviations, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act certification requirements, DoD 5000 Series and Integrated Logistics Support Plans. (Not all inclusive)

The SAT used a milSuite site to share and save program specific documents and slides, while the instructions for each SYSCOM are on their respective websites. The team brainstormed on the best possible approach to effect Navy-wide change from a policy perspective and quickly agreed that trying to change the FM, ILS and contracting instructions of each SYSCOM while simultaneously changing the program management instruction of each program executive office (PEO) was not feasible.

DoD authority and functional assignments for acquisitions are assigned by the DoD 5000 Series of instructions, this reference become the focus of our policy piece.

SMEs for information collection – program managers; NAVSUP allowancing process owner and execution agents; Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) logistics experts; DLA; lifecycle managers; procuring contracting officers; financial analysts; assistant program managers for logistics and/or ILS teams; and Training-With-Industry participants.

To the surprise of none, the answers and opinions about underlying disconnects covered just about every aspect of the acquisition process but in the interests of brevity –the overall theme was that timely cross-functional communication and contingency planning were recurring themes. The programs are relatively stringent in following the detailed planning phases covered in the DoD 5000 up to the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM). This leads to a relatively well thought out logistics support plan to provide the overall concept for the lifecycle support of the system. We discovered a downstream disconnect after reviewing some of the programs highlighted by our team’s NAVSUP contingent; this being that enclosures six and seven of the DoD 5000.02 do not require an immediate effort by the business and financial management (BFM) and logistics operations to synchronize with organic support (DLA and NAVSUP) if a budget mark is anticipated to make a programs previously planned CLS untenable.

Known process metrics and/or expected performance goals – The FM, ILS, Acquisition and IT domains contain a substantial subset of metrics and goals that measure individual elements of performance specific to these specialties. There is no single definitive metric that serves as an objective all-encompassing indicator on the overall health of cradle-tograve processes nor is there a tool that allows us to measure the amount of readiness that the Navy gains for a given amount of funding. In light of this, we will look at return on investment for our pilot programs and try to determine if there is any commonality/predictor that led to a shift in the support strategies and the timing involved to see if the shift in strategy led to additional  “effectiveness” during execution as funding challenges were encountered. The expected payoff of this is to see if we can deploy a tool or methodology to predict when budget considerations may force a major reconsideration of the support strategy.

Our research into this area revealed numerous approaches and thoughts on ways to improve upon our current methods but no single approach brought forth coalescence on a method to comparatively, objectively evaluate the downstream effectiveness impact of an additional dollar of logistics support. The research reveals multiple systems, metrics, accounting approaches and points of measure that make narrowing down to one approach that would allow a decision-maker to confidently compare the increase in effectiveness based on putting an additional dollar beyond our team’s grasp at this time. The state of the art was not advanced by our research but the determination of return on investment is an area ripe for further evaluation.

Relevant organizations/processes for comparison and benchmarking will include the littoral combat ship (LCS) and P-8 in an effort to seek PBL, CLS, organic, and mixed strategies to determine what factors influenced the decision-making approach on this front.

The lessons learned from these programs and comparing them to the DoD 5000, other policies and Joint Strike Fighter Logistics Support Plan demonstrate that the factors and assumptions made at key points of each program rarely are accurate across the lifecycle and introduce the need for flexibility into the mix and reinforces the validity of contingency planning.

One common problem that we have seen when budget mark forces a program to adopt an organic support plan is that the technical data package to provide this support is not forthcoming.

Stakeholders identified for engagement include Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN), DLA, PEOs, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, NAVSEA, NAVSUP, NAVAIR, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, program managers, and applicable partnership councils/groups.

The introduction of a “training” piece from the Leadership Charter brief highlighted the need to reach out to the training pipeline, both now and as the recommendations are implemented. The original premise involved injecting this topic as part of a capstone course from program managers, BFMs, APM-logistics and contracting leaders remains valid and crucial in our opinion. Lt. Cmdr. Stickel, Lt. Brill and Lt. Grayum had reached out to their peers and identified an opportunity at the post-graduate level – 810 or Navy Postgraduate School – since these officers are most likely to be in a position to identify the impact earliest.

Recommended improvement approach

With an eye toward capturing lessons learned to help the future platforms avoid sustainment/supply support issues, the team will explore two allowancing “pilots” (LCS for maritime and P-8 for aviation). The team will explore the establishment/maintenance of ILS, maintenance plans, and tech data for newer systems where hybrid/PBL/creative support approaches were proposed in the original strategy to see if budget and operational realities were being used to calibrate optimistic or inaccurate out-year projections, ultimately leading to a conversion of platforms from a CLS approach to a modified hybrid support approach. For LCS and P-8, the team will define/document the ILS/maintenance plan/tech data package processes, and identify “lessons learned”/key indicators in order to help shape a support strategy for future programs that could plan for or avoid potential issues down the road. The team will also identify where the Supply Corps equities are addressed in the requirements generation phase to see if we have the proper governance, integration of maintenance requirements and supply systems and input, in order to improve planning and execution.

The review of select programs and the changes they encountered showed each has a “story” that involved good people making the best possible decisions in an uncertain environment. The review also revealed extensive coordination requirements prior to the ADM being signed; in some instances the Navy was not as well served by the same level of timely coordination when a downstream
budget mark forced the reconsideration of the logistics support strategy.

Follow-on pieces will cover details of our People, Training and Policy efforts.

People

We have identified a preliminary concept of military and civilian SMEs who would be in a position to alert NAVSUP and DLA of pending budgetary changes, and those that should be alerted, so that we can establish the work-around communication channels prior to the change to the DoD 5000 and training regime taking hold. This step is designed to overcome a systemic oversight on the logistics support strategies we reviewed and the lack of clarity in the DoD 500 series. This is not all-inclusive; rather these are the people who would assist in more fully developing the list and deploying the training module.

Background: The FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT SAT was stood up in May 2015 and proceeded to formulate a team charter and path forward defining goals in order to meet the Chief’s intent under the leadership and guidance of a Flag sponsor. In July 2015, the SAT had progressed to the point of identifying sub-teams to meet specific objectives in support of the SAT’s goals and charter: “policy” focused on regulation/policy rewrite; “training” focused on developing training modules regarding the rewrites; and “people” focused with the specific goal to “identify the Active, Reserve and civilian SMEs who would be in a position to alert NAVSUP and DLA leadership of pending budgetary changes and those that should be alerted to such a change so that we can establish the work-around communication channels prior to the proposed change to the DoD 5000 and training regime taking hold.”

“People” Discussion: The People sub-team consists of: Commanding Officer of Navy Reserve at NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Sigonella Capt. Ed Chevalier (director of Environmental Contracts for Naval Facilities Engineering Command Southwest in his civilian capacity); Supply Division Chief (J-4) at the Joint Staff Capt. Pam Theorgood; and NAVSUP Business Systems Center Executive Officer Cmdr. James Murphy. At the onset of the team establishment it was offered that while Reservists may happen to be in a position to alert of pending budgetary changes it would only be because of their civilian job unless the rare situation they were serving in such a position while on Reserve duty. No such instance of that was apparent. Further, Reserve engagement was expected to be of potential value as the team finalizes its deliverables as recommended below.

The team conferred and agreed on direct outreach to point of contacts (POCs) from a list of gatekeepers provided by the Office of Personnel (OP) as the initial step, in essence asking first and defining later what kind of individuals we were seeking based on the feedback from the various POCs. POCs were identified for NAVSUP Echellons II and III as well as for NAVAIR and NAVSEA and consisted of FM, acquisition and logistics representatives. The initial request to the POCs: “We’re looking for a list of individuals in your organization by name with number and email of those you would consider ‘key’ subject matter experts or by their position would, could or should be privy to emergent budgetary changes or shifts to programs that could affect downstream logistics. Please identify military, civilian, and Reservists in not only logistics, but FM, acquisition or other related shops within your organization. Our team will then reach out, connect, share our mission and validate/fine tune the who’s who. The FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT SAT intends to use the POCs as an “early warning” communications system for potential budget driven logistics impacts to NAVSUP, DLA and others in the interim, with the SAT’s ultimate goals of establishing a training curriculum and affecting a change to the DoD 5000.”

POCs were responsive and most discussions occurred via phone with occasional emails, all helping refine not only who we’re interested in identifying, but what information we should be looking to convey.

Over the course of several weeks, numerous things became apparent. First, the overall ‘upstream’ source and initial source within the SYSCOMs are the FM leaders with the logistics and acquisition types being the recipients of information from FM. One area for improvement that our research revealed was the inconsistent use of one resource that we are periodically missing here – the Supply Officers in the OPNAV N9 arena, the resource sponsors. The surface, air and submarine resource sponsor billets should have or could be privy to discussion on funding changes. These billets traditionally know, before a program office does, potential budget changes…especially in the programming phase. The lack of Supply officers in the Navy’s Office of Budget (FMB) and SYSCOM program offices prevents us from having “eyes” on funding and execution plans in the execution year. Second, it appears the informational stream begins at OPNAV N4. At this point the team is not aware of any further points ‘upstream’ regarding budget decisions that could be tapped given the response by Capt. Frank Futcher, OPNAV N415, wherein he states, “As it relates to “future” budgetary impacts, I doubt any programmer or decision maker will let out any POM [Program Objective Memorandum] / programmatic information until OSD [The Office of the Secretary of Defense] releases the formal POM17 budget. The risk with that is very high and those discussions typically take place on SIPR [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network].” Essentially it appears access to pre-decisional budget change considerations is closely guarded and would not be offered or allowed to be promulgated regardless of the intentions.

The team determined that even if we did have access to such information it was indeed ‘pre-decisional’ meaning it would still be subject to alteration before finalization, the time advantage of knowing further in advance of the promulgation may not be significant and the mechanics of gleaning the information may prove difficult all leading to the conclusion that further efforts to seek pre-decisional information is unnecessary. More specifically, budget decisions are communicated by FMB to the Budget Submitting Office (BSO)/program POCs, with OPNAV N96/97/98 playing an integral role in proposing and defending funding changes that impact their warfare communities. The changes, recorded in the President’s Budget Information System (PBIS) which program offices have access to, are carefully watched for potential changes in their own programs. The lack of Supply officers, either as BFMs or as LOGs in SYSCOM program offices, may hinder our ability to get the first warning on potential impacts if we don’t look to a more expansive audience. The planning figures or decisions are communicated to the resource sponsors which then trickles down to the cognizant program offices and BFMs impacted by any of the budget adjustments. Relevant OPNAV resource sponsors may be a good link up for the embedded NAVSUP liaison officers (LNOs) at NAVSEA who are now aligned under NAVSUP Headquarters N41. Resource sponsors will have more early warning capability, and the LNOs will have more insight on the logistic impact of the budget adjustment. Reaching out to the BFMs, who will see the magnitude and overall impact of any decision and the LNOs for details of the logistics impact, concurrently presents the best chance of being alerted to an inbound shift in support strategy. Key process POCs may reside in the comptroller shops of the BSOs within the Department of the Navy, but program office BFMs have the overall responsibility to respond to the proposed changes and take actions once the decision is made. Many of our billets at the BSO’s Comptroller get involved only when the program office asks for assistance. Usually the program office engages with its OPNAV resource sponsor and FMB action officer. SYSCOM comptrollers would only be involved if the specific program office raised it as an issue to the comptroller organization. The magnitude of budget changes does not allow the SYSCOM comptroller to review each change in budget either in the POM or the execution years.

The team contemplated that while the BSO comptroller types would be key POCs, would we expect them to know whether a mark or cut decision is impactful to our logistics concerns or would we rely on the logistics types in the program offices to decipher the impact? Postulating, it depends on the type of budget cut that happens. If a spares account is cut, then perhaps a more direct logistics impact can be assumed.

However, if a program is cut, it may be difficult to know how the program office will adjust their spending plan based on the severity or nature of the budget adjustment; will logistics suffer or will other capability trade-offs be made? The BSOs could communicate if an adjustment was made, but probably won’t know the exact logistics fallout from the cut (or increase). Therefore, deciphering the impact would need to be at the program executive office (PEO) or program office level, but not all programs are similar. The lead logistician for many programs is probably a civilian so understanding the 5000 rewrite and continuity is less of a concern but what and how BSOs communicate is a point of issue that perhaps resides with the other two SATs for consideration and where our efforts overlap.

Back to the team’s goal, it appears there are three levels of POCs that would complement our efforts—OPNAV N9 resource sponsors, program office BFMs and as a start, the NAVSUP N41 LNOs who are embedded in the NAVSEA PEO/program offices. The resource sponsors communicate changes with program office BFMs. BFMs then communicate with their program office leadership, including the lead logistician. Lead logisticians must be aggressive about staying on top of the financial decisions made and recognizing impact. The lead logisticians must then communicate budget impacts and coordinate next steps or mitigation plans with all supporting stakeholders.

“People” Recommendations:

  1. Request a list of OPNAV resource sponsor Supply officers in N86/97/98; the BFMs at the program offices; and request FMB to provide a list of are BSO POCs with whom they coordinate – these people are the early warning system of major changes. Gather a list of PEO/program office lead logisticians –NAVSEA and NAVSUP hired a GS15 Logistician in each PEO to be NAVSUP’s eyes and ears. NAVSEA LNOs for example are now part of NAVSUP Headquarters N3/N4 organization, specifically in the N41 code. There is an LNO for PEO Ships, carriers, LCS, subs, integrated warfare systems, and SEA21 – these are the type of entry points that we are seeking as part of the interim solution and to assist with the long term implementation.
  2. Plan to use Reserve assets to review SAT deliverable.
  3. Coordinate with other SAT sub-teams and set due dates for the preceding.

Training

We will cover the training component and why our team developed a short training module to articulate the policy change andthe need for it at the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)/National Defense University (NDU)/Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) capstone courses for PMs, comptroller, contracting, and logistics.

Background: The Training sub-team was set up in July 2015 to focus on developing training modules regarding the proposed DoD 5000 rewrites and develop a challenge to the acquisition workforce that would highlight the issues that revolve around an unanticipated budget mark that would negatively impact the program’s ability to execute a contractor logistics support or PBL strategy.

The Training piece of the deliverable is designed to fill three roles:

  1. Provide a tool to frame the discussion for the “People” sub-team’s efforts in order to alert program SMEs of the downstream impacts and challenges brought forth by a shift in the logistics support plans;
  2. Train the next generation of acquisition personnel to consider the driver and impact of a change in the logistics support plan; and
  3. Act as a repository for the key decision-making considerations for personnel.

“Training” Discussion: The Training sub-team consists of Commander, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) – Boston, Capt. Scott Hoffman; NAVSUP Deputy Assistant Commander for Enterprise Logistics Engineering (N6) Capt. Doug Bridges; United States European Command Joint Logistics Planner, Strategy & Engagements Lt. Cmdr. Ryan Stickel; DCMA Boston Contracting Officer Lt. Thad Brill; NAVAIR BFM Intern Lt. Travis Grayum; and NAVSUP ASCENT Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) Black Belt, NAVSUP N5, Mr. Russell Young. The initial goal was to develop the premise behind a thought piece for the DAU curriculum at the “capstone” course level for the PM, FM, logistics and contracting senior leaders. The team discovered a few other opportunities that deserved exploration, such as:

  1. Inject a case study or scenario based session into the capstone courses for PM, FM, logistics and contracting at DAU, Senior Acquisition Course and, potentially, NPS.
  2. There is an opportunity for a long-term study such as thesis sponsorship for training/curriculum development.
  3. Case study material can be developed at NPS, DAU, or the war colleges.
  4. Potential exists for Operations Analysis/Operations Research folks to develop interactive graphic user interface programs where updated material can be loaded/tested.
  5. Several training portals offer an inexpensive method to train our dispersed personnel with the understanding that Navy Knowledge Online may be sun-setting.
  6. Engage the Supply Acquisition and Distribution Management (810) Civilian Institutions Programs and/or the Executive Training Program pipeline to use their experience and classmates to bring a fresh perspective.
  7. Key sponsors/gatekeepers we should engage for ideas – OSD, OP, Fleet Comptrollers, PEOs, PMs, DASN – Acquisition and Procurement, OPNAV, DAU, NDU, NPS.

A draft capstone thought-piece was designed to provoke a discussion at classes on the importance of communication when a budget mark is projected to shift some portion of the logistics support from CLS or PBL to organic support. The training is designed to consider this before the initial award of the contract so that the program is able to plan, prioritize and negotiate based on this contingency while the government retains the most leverage.

Policy

Oak Leaf gold line Line ArtThe FM/ILS/Acquisition/IT Team efforts to create a draft change to the DoD 5000 that would indicate the requirement that outyear budget changes affecting the downstream logistics support be communicated with NAVSUP, DLA and other key stakeholders based on the systems place in the acquisition life cycle. The draft covers the tech data package and other info/assumptions needed by the organic support activities to provide short notice organic weapon systems support.

Background: The Policy sub-team was set up in July 2015 to focus on developing a proposed DoD 5000 rewrite to drive consideration of the issues that revolve around an unanticipated budget mark negatively impacting the program’s ability to execute a CLS or PBL strategy.

This Policy effort was led by, NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support Deputy Commander-Aviation, now at DLA, Capt. Daniel Hodgson; NAVSUP WSS, N6, Mr. Dennis Forney, who was ably relieved by Ms. Theresa Reed and Mr. Raymond Cook upon his retirement; DASN (AP) Capt. Luis Trevino; NAVSEA Deputy Comptroller, SEA01B, Certified Defense Financial Manager-A Capt. Edward “Chip” Zawislak; and NAVSUP WSS Deputy Commander-Aviation Capt. Dave Rhone.

“Policy” Discussion: The Team’s review of the recent DoD 5000.02 revision and Better Buying Power memos revealed numerous improvements that should help minimize the number of surprise conversions from original equipment manufacturer/contractor to organic support. However, we did identify a gap that would potentially manifest itself after the Acquisition Decision Memorandum had been approved and the program had gone into sustainment in that there does not seem to be a policy that requires the communication link between comptrollers, logistics planner and the organic support organizations in the event that a budget mark required a reclama that impacts how the support was to be provided; nor does there appear to be an incentive to contingency plan for a budget mark that shifts the logistics support nor bring the notional supporting organizations into the planning or re-planning process. The factors we think should be considered were discussed earlier in the Training section.

The following section represents some thoughts and a cut/paste section to revise the DoD 5000.02. NAVSUP and all of the SYSCOMs would be routed the proposed changes so the team recommends a coordinated approach to the change to ease its incorporation. Stakeholders for the coordination should include the SYSCOMS, DASN (AP), OPNAV, Navy Contracting Council, Naval Aviation Enterprise, Surface Warfare Enterprise and the Fleet Comptrollers.

DoD 5000.02 – Recommended Changes

5. Procedures, a. (4) (f) — “The documents prepared in support of the decision process (e.g., Acquisition Strategy, Systems Engineering Plan (SEP), Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP)) should generally not be prepared solely for staff review and approval, but be intended primarily for use within the program as planning and management tools that are highly specific to the program and tailored to meet program needs.”

This is the first mention of LCSP and should be reviewed (signed?) by NAVSUP; or at least NAVSUP POC should be involved in the major program LCSP.

4. TMRR Phase, (b) (1) – “This phase should include a mix of activities intended to reduce the specific risks associated with the product to be developed. This includes additional design trades and requirements trades necessary to ensure an affordable product and executable development and production programs. Capability requirements are matured and validated, and affordability caps are finalized during this phase. The TMRR Phase requires continuous and close collaboration between the program office and the requirements communities and authorities. During this phase, any realized Should Cost management savings should normally be used to further reduce program risk and future program costs. Enclosure 2 describes baseline cost control and the use of Should Cost management.”

This paragraph discusses collaboration with requirements communities in Milestone A…we were not sure if they actually consulted NAVSUP community re: affordability, but they should. Again, we should be involved now in accordance with their instruction.

4. TMRR Phase (g) (1) — “Provide logistics requirements, workload estimates, and logistics risk assessment.”

NAVSUP community should be engaged here as well…this is also Milestone A and we should at least know what the “plan” is so we can engage our operating codes and budget folks in advance.

Milestone and Phase Information Requirements, continued…

The LCSP (detailed in Enclosure 6) is approved at Milestone B…this document basically determines the future logistical requirements – or sustainment across the life cycle. The NAVSUP community can impact this plan and drive early decisions, or at least plan for decisions that are made here. Per enclosure (6), the program manager is responsible for the product support strategy…and in that strategy is the LCSP. “Program managers for all programs are responsible for developing and maintaining an LCSP consistent with the product support strategy, beginning at Milestone A. The plan will describe sustainment influences on system design and the technical, business, and management activities to develop, implement, and deliver a product support package that maintains affordable system operational effectiveness over the system life cycle and seeks to reduce cost without sacrificing necessary levels of program support. The Acquisition Strategy will also include an overview of the product support strategy and sustainment-related contracts.” This is the opportunity for the support activities to influence the future sustainment support costs and at the very least should be at this table and offer perspective on how they think those decisions will impact the support agencies (NAVSUP, DLA and Fleet Readiness Centers) in the future (the document mentions DLA but not NAVSUP).

The Core Logistics Analysis…By Milestone A, the DoD Component will document its determination of applicability of core depot-level maintenance and repair capability requirements in the LCSP in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2366a (Reference (g)). For Milestone B, the program manager will attach the program’s estimated requirements for maintenance, repair and associated logistics capabilities and workloads to the LCSP in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2366b. The program’s maintenance plan will ensure that core depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities and capacity are established not later than four years after initial operational capability in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2464.

The NAVSUP contingent of our team alerted us to the existence of complementary NAVSUP ASCENT CPI effort. A review of this effort’s charter shows them to be attacking the same issue from a different vector.

The Maritime Allowancing process crosses through three major commands; NAVSUP, NAVSEA, and NAVSUP BSC. (Note – Our effort crystalized the recognition that we may want to address the audience as four commands – Naval Sea Logistics Center (NAVSEALOGCEN) is a critical player in this process and may have the most knowledgeable employees on this process.) No one employee can be found at any of these commands who has the full picture of how an item goes from an allowance requirement to being stocked on the ship. Although NAVSUP WSS manages the allowance process, it does not have full control over it, which makes it difficult to address problems. NAVSUP WSS wants to document how the process works today and identify areas for improvement across the commands so the Fleet can count on the right items being stocked at all times.

The Navy measures the effectiveness of its logistics system through two metrics; gross and net effectiveness. Gross effectiveness measures how well the retail level of supply (i.e. the ship) supports items for repair regardless of whether that item is an allowance or not carried item. Net effectiveness measures against the NAVSUP WSS allowance for the retail customer, the ship, and determines if they did or did not have the part when requested. The goals for gross and net effective are:

SURFACE/CVN: 65% Gross, 85% Net
SSN: 75% Gross, 90% Net
SSBN: 90% Gross, 97% Net

The expected benefits of this project (Check all that apply, indicate PRIMARY benefit – financial and/or mission)

NAVSUP WSS manages the process for Maritime Allowancing but only has control and visibility of a portion of the process. The other segments are run by NAVSEA, NAVSEALOGCEN and NAVSUP BSC.

NAVSUP WSS wants to document the current Maritime Allowancing process to identify how a part goes from an allowancing model value to being stocked on the ship.

The need to document the process is two-fold, many employees who hold the corporate knowledge about this process are slated to retire in the next two years and the net effectiveness for CVNs, SSN and SSBN are all below the goal values (see Business Impact section for goals and 2nd quarter 2015 current values). When the net effectiveness falls this low it impacts the Fleet’s ability to execute its mission. A greater understanding of this complex process will allow NAVSUP WSS to more effectively work with all stakeholders to improve allowancing effectiveness and better support the Fleet.

The Policy team’s goal with the DoD 5000 change is to modify this source document for so many of the Navy’s policies, thereby driving change in all of the subordinate documents.

The timing of this effort is falling into place with some of the language National Defense Authorization Act that recognizes, “…program managers benefit from more power, but also require more accountability.” The need for these empowered program managers to better coordinate could be codified by Senator Orin Hatch’s effort, “…which carves out a greater role for the sustainment community early on in the acquisition process.” It will be incumbent on our community to use this opportunity to inject the lessons we have learned from the P8 and LCS to improve the Navy’s contingency planning on the logistics front and perhaps use the reclama process as a warning order that organic support may be called upon where it was not previously anticipated.

The purpose of this update on the FM-ILS-Acquisition-IT Team was to inform the community of the ongoing effort and validate or generate additional ideas…if you see an area that would benefit from your input please contact one of the team members.

As our SAT efforts continue, you will be able to find updates on the website. In the future, an idea and suggestion tab will be included so that you may propose ideas/suggestions that each of the SATs will be able to consider as they continue to execute their charters. Continued support of this effort remains integral to the successful development of the ideas that will revolutionize how the supply community operates.

July/August 2016